| Article | |
|---|---|
| Article name | Political normativity and political obligations |
| Authors | Shevchenko A.. doctor of philosophy, leading researcher, shev@philosophy.nsc.ru |
| Bibliographic description | |
| Category | Politology |
| DOI | 303.09 |
| DOI | 10.21209/2227-9245-2019-25-10-92-98 |
| Article type | Scientific |
| Annotation | The paper presents a theoretical analysis of political normativity in comparison to moral normativity. It reviews the main arguments of the proponents of political realism who consider political normativity to be a distinctive kind of normativity, non-reducible to moral normativity. In general, such argumentation relies on the presuppositions about the existence of irreducible political disagreements and procedures of their resolution. The constructivist approach to handling political disagreements involves leaving the zone of the morally universal and working with the politically acceptable, reaching compromises between political subjects of various levels. Thus, political normativity requires taking into account not only general principles but the general political content, which would unite the members of the political community. The paper shows that defining the sphere of the politically normative requires not only general legitimation strategies of the existing political order but also a number of key “thick” concepts one of which is the concept of political obligation. It also describes the main feature of political obligation as a bridge between the spheres of morality and legality and identifies the shortcomings of treating political obligations as associative. Finally, the paper argues for the need to preserve voluntary involvement and reflexive acceptance of obligations by political subjects. Political subjectivity, both individual and collective, is an essential component of political normativity. Individual political subjectivity requires the capacity for reflexive judgement and individual choice. Collective political subjectivity presupposes understanding of the gaps between the requirements of individual and collective rationality and the capacity for collective action |
| Key words | normativity; political obligations; associative obligations; rationality; political realism; political consensus; political loyalty; constructivism; political subjectivity; collective action |
| Article information | Shevchenko А. Political normativity and political obligations // Transbaikal State University Journal, 2019, vol. 25, no. 10, pp. 92–98. DOI: 10.21209/2227-9245-2019-25-10-92-98. |
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| Full article | Political normativity and political obligations |
